B Derivation of Policy Variables
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we must use additional steps to generate policy variables for all the municipalities because some of the municipalities merged in 2005 and did not exist in the previous year. We define the policy variables for unit pricing and the number of sorting categories as follows: However, if municipality i did merge with other municipalities, then the policy variables are defined as the weighted average of the one-year lagged policy variables for each municipality in the pre-merger period. The weight is defined as the share of waste discharge.
C Formal Definition of SWM1
We assume that municipalities are considered contiguous if they are in the same prefecture.
When the ith municipality is contiguous with the jth municipality, the (i, j) element of the spatial weight matrix takes a value of one in our case. For instance, if there are three municipalities in each of two prefectures A and B (see Figure 2) , the spatial weight matrix is as follows: A3 B1 B2 B3  A1 0  1  1  0  0  0  A2 1  0  1  0  0  0  A3 1  1  0  0  0  0  B1 0  0  0  0  1  1  B2 0  0  0  1  0  1  B3 0  0  0  1  1  0 Then, our actual spatial matrix, W , is
where
Note that K(= 47) is the number of prefectures. As is assumed in the previous literature, the diagonal elements of D k in the spatial weight matrix are set to zero, and the row elements sum to one when we use (2) in the actual estimation.
D Spatial Durbin Model
It has often been observed that some policy variables are spatially correlated. Our main purpose is to see if there is any evidence for absolute decoupling for household waste generation. Table D3 summarizes the turning points computed based on the MCMC estimation of (4). Again, the results are nearly identical to the turning points presented in the main text. 
E Estimation Results for Spatial Effects
One of the notable differences between the conventional OLS and the SARD model is the interpretation of marginal effects by the explanatory variable, such as z ir . Suppose a usual OLS, such as
Then, a marginal effect on a dependent variable (y i ) by z ir is ∂y i ∂z ir = β r . Suppose further that α, β r , and θ r are the parameters and that ι n is an n × 1 vector of 1s. The SARD model version of (5) is
and S r (W ) ij is the i, j th element of S r (W ). It is now clear that the derivative of y i by z ir is no longer equal to β r and
Thus, a change in the independent variable of a region could have an effect on the dependent variable in all other regions. In fact, taking the own derivative of (6) results in S r (W ) ii , which is the impact on a dependent variable in region i caused by changing x ir . Note that this impact includes the feedback effect that region i has on region j and that region j also affects region i. The average of this effect among all n regions is called the direct effect and Pace (2009, p. 36) , which is
Note that S r (W ) contains (I n − ρW ) −1 = I n + ρW + ρW 2 + · · · and that the diagonal of the higher order of W , which has zeros on its diagonal, is not necessarily zero. LeSage and Pace (2009) also define the total effect as
M total simply measures how a change in region i influences all other regions. It is straightforward to interpret subtracting a region's own effect from M total ; the result is called the indirect effect. Note: The quantile figures above are based on sample generated during MCMC procedure.
Looking carefully Table E1 , we note that the effect of unit pricing for households and business entities is completely the opposite. For households, the direct effect is positive, which indicates that average households reduce waste if they face the introduction of unit pricing. Business entities, in contrast, have a positive value for the direct effect. The reason for this effect could be that the unit pricing for business waste has been introduced in municipalities that already had greater business MSW generation. This result is another example of how household MSW and business MSW are different in terms of their generation processes.
